Representation is the most obvious function. Did it not give its name to the representative system? But it is as complex as it is vital because it covers the various fundamental and conflicting issues at stake.

a. The most traditional and doubtless the most investigated contradiction is that between representation as mandate, which confines the role of the person represented to designating his or her agent, and representation as a reflection which further requires that the agent is as similar as possible to the person represented in order to prevent the latter’s sovereignty from being excessively altered, not to say betrayed or substantially alienated, by the machinery of representation. Adherents of the theory – encouraged by law and philosophy – that the electorate determines the office uphold or upheld the first hypothesis, whereas those more sensitive to sociology – considering that the electorate confers the right – uphold the second. 

But this contradiction does not say everything about the complexity of the function of representation. What in fact does it mean to serve the function of representation in an election? At least three answers can be given to this question.

b. The first relates to the representation of political opinions and hence of the movements and forces giving form to them. It is axiomatic that representation itself raises numerous problems. Is it necessary to represent all tendencies, including the most minority ones? Should existing tendencies be favoured to the detriment of emerging parties or should emerging tendencies be encouraged in order to make it easier to adapt what is on offer politically to suit new issues? Should the spirit of compromise be fostered by making the formation of coalitions possible through mechanisms such as the second round or “apparentement”? Most of the answers given to each of these questions dictate the choice of the electoral system or of one or more of its refinements.

c. The second meaning attached to representation relates to the representation of territories. Here too the range of options available is to a large degree open. The first choice concerns the very existence of such representation: should the emphasis be given to the overall representation of the electoral population – as is the case in certain democracies with a relatively small population but also in larger states in the case of certain elections (the European elections in France up until a recent reform) – or should representation be broken down to the level of smaller entities? The second choice has to do with the nature of those entities: should a territory be divided into ad hoc electoral constituencies or should administrative divisions simply be adopted? The third choice relates to the demographic and perhaps spatial dimension of the entities decided upon: should the constituencies be large enough to guarantee a measure of heterogeneity of the electorate or smaller in order to guarantee that the electorate is homogenous?

d. This consideration cuts across the third meaning of representation, which relates to the representation of specific categories of the electorate. Some of those categories may be represented through geographical representation if where they are to be found coincides with one or more electoral constituencies. This may be the case with ethnic and cultural categories, which are often referred to as national minorities in multi-cultural states. But, because of their nature or the fact that they are more widely dispersed, other categories do not coincide with particular areas. Is it necessary to provide in the electoral system for specific representation and, if so, what form should that representation take? Some systems make use of quotas, occasionally coupled with financial penalties in the event of non-compliance, as in the case of France and the application of equality between men and women in elections. This example is very interesting since it marks a conclusive break with the traditionally abstract and formally egalitarian conception of citizenship under the French model. According to that tradition, the citizen (and hence the elector) is a reasonable being who allows the public interest to transcend the specific interests of his or her gender, age, occupation, ethnic and cultural origin and religious belief. Insofar as it introduces positive discrimination in favour of classes which are equal under the law but de facto disadvantaged vis-à-vis the dominant classes, the electoral system fulfils a new function. It does not merely distribute seats in accordance with votes, but seeks to influence a change in social relationships and becomes an overt instrument for redistributing political power between categories of the electorate.