The revised Article 104 par 1 retains the quite extensive supervisory powers of the Office of the Prosecutor. Such a “supervisory” prosecution model is in fact reminiscent of the old Soviet prokuratura model. At the same time, over the last decades, many post-communist democracies have sought to deprive their prosecution services of extensive powers in the area of general supervision, by transferring such prerogatives to other bodies, including national human rights institutions (such as an Ombudsperson). The rationale for such reforms was to abolish what was considered to be an over-powerful and largely unaccountable prosecution service. Maintaining the prosecution service as it is in the Constitution could mean retaining a system where vast powers are vested in only one institution, which may pose a serious threat to the separation of powers and to the rights and freedoms of individuals. The maintenance of such wide prosecutorial supervisory powers has been repeatedly criticized by international and regional organizations, among them OSCE/ODIHR and the Venice Commission. In numerous opinions on this topic, including specifically on the legal framework regulating the prosecution service in the Kyrgyz Republic, the OSCE/ODIHR and the Venice Commission have recommended, for the above-mentioned reasons, that the supervisory role of prosecutors be abandoned and that their competences be restricted to the criminal sphere. The drafters should therefore consider reforming their prosecution service by removing its general supervisory powers and confining its powers to the criminal field.