The – partly overlapping – rationales of the requirement to dissolve parliament between the opening for revision and the actual amendments are the following:

(2)       The protracted process allows for maturing of proposals and prevents the adoption of hasty amendments.

(3)       Reflection on the projected constitutional amendment should form part of the electoral campaign for the elections to parliament. Candidates should be able to form a position on the amendments, and the electorate would be invited to consider these proposals. The assumption is that the citizens will vote accordingly. Thus, the people would give an „indirect“ vote on the projected amendment. The constitutional amendment would thereby obtain a specific democratic basis of legitimacy.⁵

(4)       A new legislator which would be „fresh“ and would easily tackle the constitutional amendment.⁶

(5)       The parliamentary elections would thereby assume the specific function of constituting a new constituante (i.e. a new parliament which – when deciding with the qualified and heightened majority) would operate as a constituante (in the sense of Constitution-reviser).⁷